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Principles Based Regulation:  Risks, Challenges and Opportunities 
 
 
Professor Julia Black1 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the current climate, there is excuse for thinking that ‘principles-based’ regulation is the answer that we’ve 
all been looking for.  Principles-based regulation will provide flexibility for firms, facilitate innovation and so 
enhance competitiveness; principles are also good for regulators, providing them with flexibility, facilitating 
regulatory innovation, and enhancing regulatory competitiveness; and other stakeholders can benefit from the 
improved conduct of firms as they focus more on improving substantive compliance and less on box-ticking 
or on ‘creative compliance’.  But, as we all know, life is never that simple.  Principles are criticised for not 
providing certainty; for creating an unpredictable regulatory regime in which regulators can act 
retrospectively; for allowing firms to ‘backslide’, and get away with the minimum level of conduct possible; 
and thus for providing inadequate protection to consumers or others. 
 
The point of this paper is not to discuss the respective advantages and disadvantages of different types of rules.  
That is part of the issue, but we have reached a stage in the debate where we need to take the question much 
further.  We need to focus in more depth on just how principles, and other types of rules and guidance, are 
used by different actors in regulatory regimes; we need to focus on whether they do in fact have the 
behavioural effects which are claimed; we need to examine in far more depth just what the surrounding 
institutional context needs to be for principles to ‘work’; we need to address head on the difficult question of 
determining when in a regulatory regime certain fixed points are needed around which firms can determine 
what conduct is necessary to constitute compliance; and we need to look much more closely what the ‘rules of 
engagement’ underlying the regulatory conversations concerning the interpretation and application of 
principles need to be.  
 
It is on these issues that this paper will focus.  The paper will briefly set out what principles-based regulation 
means.  It will examine briefly the distinction between different types of rules, and illustrate the trade-offs that 
are inevitably involved in decisions on which types of rules to use in an attempt to govern or change 
behaviour.  It will then focus on the acclaimed advantages of principles, and look at such evidence as there is 
on how rule type affects behaviour.  The paper turns then to examine the risks and challenges of principles-
based regulation, again drawing on practical experience of their use, before turning in the fourth part to focus 
on the more challenging questions of what the ‘critical success factors’ are for principles based regulation to 
deliver on all that is promised for it. 
 
The particular context in which they will be discussed is the UK Financial Service Authority’s recent move to 
a ‘more principles-based approach’ to regulation.   There are certain peculiarities of the FSA regime which 
mean there are some issues of translation, as it were, to other regulatory regimes.  Most relevant in this regard 
are the FSA’s extensive enforcement powers and consequently the minimal role played by the courts in the 
                                                     
1 This paper is based on a paper written members of Herbert Smith LLP, notably Martyn Hopper and 
Christa Band, entitled ‘Principles Based Regulation: In Principle and Practice (2007).  That paper formed 
the basis of two roundtable discussions on principles-based regulation held with industry and regulators 
in February and March 2007, co-hosted by Herbert Smith LLP and the LSE Law Department.  I thank all 
the participants for their valuable comments.  This paper is a revised version and does not necessarily 
represent the views of the original co-authors.  All the usual responsibilities remain my own. 
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enforcement process.  Nonetheless, the FSA’s interpretation of what ‘principles-based regulation’ (PBR) 
means, the initiatives it has pursued under the banner of PBR, and the current issues and difficulties it is 
encountering, are all potentially relevant for other regulatory regimes.  Moreover, the current holding up of 
the FSA approach as a model that others should follow, particularly by influential US commentators, have 
given the FSA’s principles-based approach a higher profile on the international financial regulatory stage than 
it would otherwise have had  Combined with parallel debates on the role of principles in accounting and tax 
regulation in particular, the issue of ‘principles based regulation’ is high on the regulatory agenda.2   
 
 
What does principles-based regulation mean? 
 
In general terms, principles-based regulation means moving away from reliance on detailed, 
prescriptive rules and relying more on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set the 
standards by which regulated firms must conduct business.   The term ‘principles’ can be used 
simply to refer to general rules, or also to suggest that these rules are implicitly higher in the 
implicit or explicit hierarchy of norms than more detailed rules: they express the fundamental 
obligations that all should observe.  Principles are used in both these senses in the FSA context.  
The eleven Principles for Business are general rules, which set out the main obligations on firms, 
and are those provisions from which the other rules and guidance in the FSA Handbook flow.3   
 
However, in the FSA context, principles based regulation means more than just using different 
types of rules.  The FSA’s recent re-formulation of principles-based regulation has three 
distinctive elements which signal a potentially radical change in the relationship between the FSA 
and the regulated industry.   These are:  
 
 greater reliance on broad-based standards in preference to detailed rules 
 a move to outcomes-based regulation 
 increasing senior management responsibility 
 
These strategies may be related and may be used together, but they are different and, importantly, 
they are therefore likely to raise different practical issues for regulators and regulated. 
 
 
Broadly stated standards in preference to detailed rules 
 
The use of broadly stated standards, rather than reliance solely on more detailed and prescriptive 
rules, has been a feature of the regulatory regime for financial services since 1992.  The FSA’s 
Principles for Business have a number of characteristics: 
                                                     
2 The issue of whether tax law should move to a more principles-based approach has been actively debated 
for some time: see eg  J.F. Avery Jones in “Tax Law: Rules or Principles?” [1996] British Tax Review 580; 
J. Braithwaite, “Making Tax Law More Certain: a Theory” (2003) 31 Australian Business Law Review 72; 
D. Weisbach, “Formalism in the Tax Law” (1999) 66 U.Chi.L.R. 860; J. 
Freedman, “Defining Taxpayer Responsibility: In Support of a General Anti-Avoidance Principle” 
[2004] British Tax Review 332; S. Picciotto, “Constructing Compliance: Game-playing, Tax Law and the 
Regulatory State” (2007) Law and Policy; J. Freedman, ‘Interpreting Tax Statutes: Tax Avoidance and the 
Intention of Parliament (2007) 123 Law Quarterly Review 53. Principles-based drafting is the subject of an 
experiment in Australia; see G. Pinder, “The Coherent Principles Approach to Tax Law Design” 
(Australian Treasury, 2005), http://tofa.treasury.gov.au/content/downloads/coherent principles.pdf. 
3 It is worth noting that there are other broadly based rules in the FSA handbook which have the same 
structure as principles, but have the status of rules. 
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• they are drafted at a high level of generality, with the intention that they should be 
overarching requirements that can be applied flexibly to a rapidly changing industry. 
• they contain terms which are qualitative not quantitative: general, usually evaluative 
terms (“fair”, “reasonable”, “suitable”) as opposed to “bright line” rules (“within 2 
business days”; “turnover of £20million”). 
• they are purposive, expressing the reason behind the rule. 
• they have very broad application to a diverse range of circumstances. 
• the Principles are largely behavioural standards – they are concerned with, for example, 
the “integrity”, “skill care and diligence” and “reasonable care” with which authorised 
firms or approved persons conduct and organise their businesses and the fairness with 
which they treat customers and manage conflicts of interest. 
• breach of a Principle must involve an element of fault.4 
• breach of the Principles can be sanctioned through public (but not private) enforcement 
action.5 
 
Although the FSA always made clear that the Principles might apply “in situations where no rule 
or guidance yet exists” (emphasis added), amplification of the Principles through other provisions 
of the handbook was integral to its design.6  Indeed, the FSA sought to reassure the industry that 
the circumstances in which enforcement action would be taken on the basis of the Principles 
alone would be rare.7   
 
More recently, the FSA has made plain its intention to place greater reliance on the Principles 
alone.  The Principles enable supervisors and enforcers to police the spirit of the rules as well as 
the letter, avoiding “creative compliance” (compliance with the letter not the spirit of the rule) 
and the need for the rules to anticipate every possible situation.  The FSA no longer considers that 
enforcement on the basis of Principles alone should be regarded as exceptional.8  It also intends to 
rely increasingly on Principles alone (supported by formal and informal guidance) in setting and 
developing standards. This approach is illustrated in the FSA’s Treating Customers Fairly 
initiative.  The TCF initiative represents a significant shift in regulatory style and approach under 
the banner of principles-based regulation.   For example, in the context of TCF the FSA has 
concentrated a great deal of attention on the processes by which firms design financial products. 
This is a radical change of focus: outside the context of regulated funds, product design has 
traditionally received very little attention from regulators whose focus has primarily been on the 
sales and advice process.  Nevertheless, the initiative has proceeded under the clear decision not 
                                                     
4 FSA Handbook PRIN 1.1.7G where it states that ‘Under each of the Principles the onus will be on the 
FSA to show that a firm has been at fault in some way.’   
5 S.150 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (although there are rules of a similar character in the 
Handbook to which the private right of action does attach). 
6 See FSA, The FSA Principles for Businesses, CP13 September 1998, at paras 9-10. 
7 Letter from the then FSA Chairman Howard Davies to the London Investment Banking Association but 
contrast this with ENF 11.6 and the fact that in 
practice enforcement cases have often been founded on breaches of the Principles alone 
8 John Tiner, Speech to FSA Enforcement Conference, June 2006: “I want to emphasise today that we can 
and do take Enforcement action on the basis of Principles alone and it is our intention to go down this route. 
The FSA set out in an often-quoted letter to the London Investment Banking Association in 1999…that we 
would expect the number of cases for a breach of 
a Principle alone to be small. This is not the position of the current FSA leadership or Board. The Principles 
are rules and we intend increasingly to take enforcement action on the basis of those Principles alone, 
where this is appropriate.” 
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to resort to writing new rules to achieve the required changes in behaviour, 9 but rather to proceed 
through a combination of exhortation (in discussion papers, speeches, examples of good and bad 
practice and other material), supervisory work and the threat of possible enforcement action.10  In 
this way Principle 6 (fair treatment of customers) has been used to effect a significant change in 
regulatory policy without a single new rule being introduced. 
.  
 
Outcomes-based regulation 
 
A second theme running through much of what the FSA says about principles-based regulation is 
the focus on “outcomes”. In a speech in December 2006 the FSA’s Director of Retail Policy 
defined the move to a more principles-based approach as “a shift of emphasis by the FSA away 
from looking at the processes carried out by firms, towards the outcomes we seek to achieve, for 
consumers, firms and markets”.11 
 
The logic of this strategy is compelling, and is one which is in line with current ‘best practice’ 
thinking on regulatory techniques.  It is based on the idea that firms and their management are 
better placed than regulators to determine what processes and actions are required within their 
businesses to achieve a given regulatory objective. So regulators, instead of focussing on 
prescribing the processes or actions that firms must take, should step back and define the 
outcomes that they require firms to achieve. Firms and their management will then be free to find 
the most efficient way of achieving the outcome required.12   Here the FSA seems to be talking 
about a strategy that is significantly different to the principles-based approach practised in the UK 
since the early 1990s. The focus on outcomes, as described by the FSA, resembles a form of 
performance-based regulation. In contrast to the setting of behavioural standards or standards of 
conduct, performance standards specify the outcome required but leave the specific measures to 
achieve that outcome up to the discretion of the regulated firm11. The outcome or performance 
standard may be tightly defined (for example, where rail operators are required to meet 
quantitative performance targets in respect of delays to trains) or more loosely defined. The 
“outcomes” that the FSA seems to have in mind appear to be much more loosely defined. In its 
July 2006 paper on TCF the FSA seeks to define six outcomes: 
 
 Consumers can be confident that they are dealing with firms where the fair treatment of 
customers is central to the corporate culture 
 Products and services marketed and sold in the retail market are designed to meet the 
needs of identified consumer groups and are targeted accordingly 
 Consumers are provided with clear information and are kept appropriately informed 
before, during and after the point of sale 
 Where consumers receive advice, the advice is suitable and takes account of their 
circumstances 
                                                     
9 FSA, Treating Customers Fairly - towards fair outcomes for consumers, July 2006, para 1.9. 
10 Clive Briault, “Making a real difference to consumers through more principles-based regulation”, FSA 
TCF Conference, 7 November 2006. 
11 “Implementing Principles-based Regulation”, Speech by Dan Waters, Director Retail Policy, FSA at the 
ABI Conference, London, 7 December 2006. 
12 There is a significant literature on this, see eg  Coglianese, Nash and Olmstead, ‘Performance-Based 
Regulation: Prospects and Limitations in Health, Safety and Environmental Protection’ [2003] 
Administrative Law Review 705. 
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 Consumers are provided with products that perform as firms have led them to expect, and 
the associated service is both of an acceptable standard and as they have been led to 
expect 
 Consumers do not face unreasonable post-sale barriers imposed by firms to change 
product, switch provider, submit a claim or make a complaint 
 
However, it remains unclear how the FSA will measure, or expects firms to measure, the 
achievement of these outcomes or what the supervisory or enforcement responses will be for 
failure to achieve these outcomes. 
 
Increased senior management responsibility 
 
The FSA has always focused on senior management responsibility, and through its approved 
persons regime has developed standards for the governance of regulated firms which go beyond 
those required under the general corporate governance code for listed companies.  There is a 
renewed emphasis on senior management responsibility under the principles-based initiative, 
however, and the Chairman of FSA, Sir Callum McCarthy, has made clear that he expects the 
move to a more Principles-based approach to result in “intensified reliance” on the senior 
management of regulated firms.13 
 
It can be argued that through the TCF initiative the FSA is also increasing the focus on the 
activities of senior management in a different and novel way.  Much of the progress that has been 
made has resulted from the “TCF programmes” that the FSA has encouraged, exhorted and, most 
recently, mandated firms to undertake, rather than the specification of outcomes or guidance on 
standards. Over time the TCF initiative has developed from gentle encouragement to a 
consideration of how firms treat their customers.14  It now involves an analysis of the key stages 
of the “product life cycle”15 and a framework for the steps that senior management must now take 
to assist them in ensuring that TCF is effectively embedded into a firm’s values, culture and the 
way it conducts business.16   In 2006 the FSA was set a “deadline” of the end of March 2007 for 
firms to get to the “implementing stage” of their TCF programmes (though the consequences of 
not meeting this deadline remain unclear).17 
 
Table 1: Key elements of a TCF Programme 
 
 Defining what TCF means for the firm 
 Assessing current performance to identify gaps where the firm is not delivering TCF 
satisfactorily 
 Developing an action plan to close any identified gaps and to embed the concept of TCF 
into the firm’s strategy, operations and culture 
 Implementing change through existing programmes or new initiatives 
 Monitoring the effectiveness of these programmes, using relevant management 
information 
 
                                                     
13 ‘Principles-Based Regulation – what does it mean for the industry?’ Speech by Callum McCarthy, 
Chairman, FSA, Financial Services Skills Council 2nd Annual Conference, 31 October 2006. 
14 Treating Customers Fairly – Progress Report, June 2002. 
15 Treating Customers Fairly – Progress and Next Steps, July 2004. 
16 Treating Customers Fairly – Building on Progress, July 2005. 
17 Treating Customers Fairly – Towards Fair Outcomes for Consumers, July 2006. 
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The cost of this process to the industry must be very significant. The benefits for consumers may 
be very great indeed. But all of this has been achieved without writing new rules or setting clear 
outcomes against which firms can easily measure their compliance or performance. 
 
A further example of the emphasis on senior management responsibility is in the FSA’s rules and 
guidance on conflicts of interest, which require firms to review their businesses, assess where 
conflicts or potential conflicts arise and put in place measures to manage those conflicts.18  Firms 
are thus left to develop their own internal policies or “rules” for addressing these issues (with the 
assistance of guidance from the regulator as to what those policies should typically include).  This 
is a radically different form of regulation – a form of “management-based regulation or ‘meta-
regulation’.19   In this mode of principles-based regulation, the FSA does not prescribe the 
processes that firms should use in conducting their regulated business.  Nor does the FSA specify 
the outcomes that should be achieved in anything but the most general of terms.  Instead, the FSA 
encourages or requires management of regulated firms to undertake certain disciplined 
programmes of review work that are designed to enable the firm’s own management to identify 
what is the best way to organise the firm’s business to achieve a broadly stated regulatory goal. 
The FSA sets out the key elements that any regulated firm should address, but gives the firm 
considerable latitude to determine what the outcome of its analysis should be. 
 
 
What are the potential benefits of a more Principles-based approach? 
 
Assessing the benefits and drawbacks of each of these three strategies in detail has merit, but is 
beyond the scope of this particular paper. Instead, we will focus mainly on the first type of 
strategy: using a particular type of rule to express required standards of behaviour. But we will 
also consider the extent to which there is a degree of “fit” or “misfit” between the three strategies. 
 
The potential benefits claimed of using principles are that they provide flexibility, are more likely 
to produce behaviour which fulfils the regulatory objectives, and are easier to comply with. 
Detailed rules, it is often claimed, provide certainty, a clear standard of behaviour and are easier 
to apply consistently and without retrospectivity. However, they can lead to gaps, inconsistencies, 
rigidity and are prone to “creative compliance”, to the need for constant adjustment to new 
situations and to the ratchet syndrome, as more rules are created to address new problems or close 
new gaps, creating more gaps and so on.  In contrast, principles-based regulation allows for a 
greater degree of ‘future-proofing’, enabling the regime to respond to new issues as they arise 
without having to create new rules.20 
 
Before we can assess the potential benefits of using principles as opposed to detailed rules, 
however, we need to bear in mind four inherent limitations of rules and rule-making. 
 
The “golden rules” of rules 
                                                     
18 See the FSA handbook, SYSC 10.1.1R ff. 
19  See eg Coglianese and Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals, 2003 Regulatory Policy Program; J. Braithwaite, ‘The New Regulatory State and 
the Transformation of Criminology’ British Journal of Criminology 40(2), 222; C. Parker, The Open 
Corporation  (Cambridge: CUP, 2002); J. Braithwaite, ‘Meta-Risk Management and Responsive 
Regulation for Tax System Integrity’ (2003) 25(1) Law and Policy 1-16. 
20 For further discussion see J. Black, ‘Using Rules Effectively’ in C. McCrudden (ed), Regulation and De-
Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 95-121. 
 
  8 
 
Rules are an integral part of regulation, but they are not a perfect regulatory instrument. All 
written rules, principles or standards have the following limitations: 
 
• Rules are just a “best guess” as to the future: The rule maker has to anticipate how 
the rule will be applied in the future. New situations may arise that were not 
expected/known about when the rule was written, and the rule may be interpreted and 
applied in ways that were not intended or anticipated by the writer. 
• Rules are never perfectly congruent with their purpose – they are always 
 over-inclusive and under-inclusive: Rules are inevitably either under-inclusive, 
failing to catch things that the rule maker might want to catch, and/or over-inclusive, 
catching things that the rule maker might not want to catch when applied to particular 
sets of circumstances. The question is how to minimise (rather than avoid) these 
problems, and whether it is preferable to exclude conduct that should be included if 
the objectives are to be served, or to include conduct that should be excluded 
included. 
• Whether a rule is clear or certain depends on shared understandings: Just looking 
at a rule does not tell us whether it is certain. Saying that a contract requires 
“consideration” may be clear to a lawyer, but is far from clear to a non-lawyer. 
Whether or not a rule is “certain” depends not so much on whether it is detailed or 
general, but whether all those applying the rule (regulator, regulated firm, 
court/tribunal) agree on what the rule means. 
• How a rule affects behaviour does not depend solely on the rule: We will explore 
the issue of how rules affect behaviour in more detail overleaf, suffice to note here 
that whether a rule has the desired effect on behaviour depends only partly on 
whether it is a precise, detailed rule or whether it is a principle. The firm’s own 
attitude to regulation, the incentive structures for compliance and non-compliance, 
and the approach taken to enforcement, are also critical. 
 
What we want from rules and what we can get 
 
Most of us want three things from rules (whether principles or more detailed rules): simplicity 
and ease of application, clarity or certainty as to what we have to do to comply, and congruence 
with their purpose – achievement of what it is they are intended to achieve. 
 
These first three qualities are what the FSA promises of Principles. That they will be outcome 
based, which at least in one sense suggests that they should be in line with the purposes of the 
regulatory regime; that they will facilitate compliance as they will be easier to apply; and that 
they will be predictable in their application – everyone will know what is expected of them.  
Unfortunately, rules, be they principles or more detailed rules, can never meet all of these 
demands.  Instead, they can only ever score two out of three, at best, as Table 3 below and Table 
4 overleaf illustrate.  Take a hypothetical example of three different types of rules which could be 
used (with paraphrasing) to communicate the requirements with respect to timely execution:21 
                                                     
21 There are several different bases on which to distinguish rules, notably: the nature of their content, and 
their structure and their legal status. The latter is the most common (legal rules/guidance; hard law/soft law). 
However rules are sometimes classified on a tripartite basis according to content: whether they are 
specification standards (setting the exact output/behaviour to be adopted); process standards (setting out 
procedures to be followed) or performance standards (identifying the outcome to be achieved): see eg A. 
Ogus, Regulation (Oxford: 1994). Alternatively they may be classified according to variations in their 
linguistic structure, on which see C.S. Diver, “The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules”, (1983) 93 
  9 
                                                                                                                                                              
Yale LJ 65; Black loc. cit. The latter classification is adopted here, as it is usual for “Principles” to refer to 
rules of a particular linguistic structure. It should be noted that the classifications on the basis of structure 
and content are not necessarily aligned; whilst specification standards do usually have a particular linguistic 
structure (precise language, often a high degree of complexity), outcome and process based standards can 
be expressed in either general or precise terms.  
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Table 2: Rule types illustrated 
 
Type 1: Bright line rule Type 2: Principle Type 3: Complex / detailed rule 
A firm must execute all orders of 
under 10,000 securities within 
one business day. 
A firm must pay due regard to the 
interests of its customers and treat 
them fairly. 
A firm must execute all orders for 
customers within one business 
day in the following 
circumstances [definition of 
customer; definition of order; 
restriction as to whether 
discretionary dealing or execution 
only; circumstances where orders 
may be worked over a longer 
period etc] 
 
 
The Type 1 rule is a “bright line” rule: it sets out a single criterion which has to be satisfied for 
the rule to apply, expressed as a quantitative measure. It is clear and straightforward to apply, but 
as is well recognised, can fail to achieve its purpose (fair treatment of customers) as there may be 
circumstances in which customers’ interests would be better served by executing orders of under 
10,000 securities over a longer period. It is easy to manipulate or “creatively comply” with 
(orders could be aggregated to avoid the rule) and indeed the rule may be missing the point 
completely as volume amount is not necessarily a good measure on which to identify which 
customers are in need of this requirement of firms. 
 
The Type 2 rule, the “Principle”, is quite different in nature. It expresses the aim of the rule – to 
apply to those who are in practice exercising control. It is focused on the substantive objective. 
However, whether or not it is certain depends on whether both regulated firms and the regulator 
agree on what constitutes “paying due regard” and “treating customers fairly”. Moreover, whilst 
it looks simple to apply (there is just one condition to meet), in practice a whole range of factors 
will have to be considered, which may make it as complex to apply as a Type 3 rule. 
 
Type 3 is a detailed or complex rule. The list of conditions that have to be met for the rule to 
apply or be complied with can mean it has a higher congruence than a Type 1, bright line rule, but 
only if they are the appropriate criteria. It can thus potentially have the congruence of a Principle 
but provide more certainty than a Principle as it elaborates on what the conditions/factors are that 
have to be taken into account. That elaboration makes it complex to apply, however (more 
information is necessary, more factors have to be taken into account), and the creation of a list 
inevitably will leave gaps and again give scope for manipulation or creative compliance. 
 
Table 3: Tradeoffs between different types of rules 
 
Rule type Ease of 
application  
Congruence Certainty Scope for 
creative 
compliance 
Type 1:  
Bright line 
High 
 
Low High High 
Type 2: Principle Depends 
 
High Depends Low 
Type 3: Complex 
standard 
Low High High High 
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Principles thus have the benefit of congruence: of communicating the regulatory objectives and 
promoting behaviour which will achieve those objectives, and of minimising the scope for 
“creative compliance”. Whether they are certain depends on the extent to which there is a shared 
understanding as to their meaning and application between regulator and regulated and any court 
or tribunal called upon to make a determination. Whether they are simple to apply depends on the 
number and type of factors to be considered in assessing their application.  The type of rule which 
is used matters not least because it affects people’s behaviour.22 Research in tax, accounting, 
auditing, financial services, health and safety and criminal law shows that whether a rule is 
detailed or general (a principle), combined with the consequences of breaching the rule, has a 
significant effect on how people respond to the rule.23 
 
Principles can potentially enhance compliance by promoting behaviour which is congruent with 
the objectives of regulation, particularly in a supervisory and  enforcement context which is 
predictable and non-aggressive.   
 
In particular: 
 Principles focus on the purpose behind the rule rather than just on the detailed provisions 
 Principles offer flexibility for regulated firm and regulator in determining how to comply 
with the rule. This facilitates responsiveness to market innovation and other 
developments, enhancing the durability of the Principles and reducing the need for 
constant amendment; 
 They are hard to manipulate, making creative compliance difficult; 
 They can lead to a decluttering of the rulebook, focusing attention on the important rules; 
 They can lead to a greater degree of substantive compliance with the purpose of the rule, 
rather than a ‘box-ticking’ approach, as they require firms to think through how to 
comply; as such they can support the development of an ethical business culture and be 
directly linked to management-based regulation; 
 A smaller number of Principles can reduce complexity. Complexity can impede 
compliance as very few of those regulated can absorb, and remember, the information 
that detailed rules are trying to communicate. In contrast, a smaller number of Principles 
can be easier to remember and reduce the complexity of compliance. However, Principles 
also require greater judgement in their application, which can result in a different form of 
complexity; 
 Principles can engage senior management in the regulatory process, and can require 
internal compliance divisions to develop a more strategic role 
 Principles can provide a basis for open dialogue between regulator and regulated firm, 
facilitating a co-operative and educative approach to supervision particularly with respect 
to firms who are well intentioned, but either ill informed, or simply confused as to what 
the regulatory provisions require.24 
 
                                                     
22 Different types of rules also involve different costs and benefits, which may be differently distributed 
between regulator, regulated firm and the beneficiaries of regulation, discussed further below, and for other, 
less direct reasons which can be related to defining the institutional position of the regulator: see Black, loc. 
cit. 1997. 
23 Diver, loc. cit. R. Baldwin, Rules and Government (Oxford, 1995); D. McBarnet and C. Whelan, “The 
Elusive Spirit of the Law: Formalism and the Spirit of Legal Control” (1991) 54 Modern Law Review 848. 
24 Baldwin, loc. cit., Black loc. cit. 
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Principles can promote substantive compliance where “creative compliance” would otherwise be 
possible, and can prompt more substantively compliant behaviour, particularly if the penalties for 
non-compliance are high.25  Where Principles are used, regulated firms are more concerned about 
error costs (“getting it wrong”) than where rules are more precise and they are less likely to 
attempt to “creatively comply”.  However, this may have a ‘chilling effect’ on their behaviour, 
prompting them to be more conservative in their interpretation as to what conduct is allowed, 
discussed further below.   Further, studies in the field of accountancy have found that there is also 
less recourse by management to legal or other expert advice, as the scope for argument as to the 
proper interpretation is seen as far greater.26   
 
There is a danger, however, in thinking that ‘one size fits all’: that the advantages and 
disadvantages of certain types of rules will be the same for all actors in the regulatory regime.  
Instead, different types of rules can help or hinder the supervision and compliance activities of 
regulators and others in different ways.  For example, detailed, precise rules can help regulators 
(and gatekeepers such as auditors) discourage non-compliant behaviour when the opportunities 
for creative compliance are not available or clients are unaware of the precise rules. Detailed rules 
can also be used more effectively than Principles to persuade recalcitrant or sceptical firms (or 
internal management) that they should change their behaviour.  Detailed rules can thus empower 
supervisors, and indeed internal compliance officers, in certain circumstances, whereas Principles 
will not, as debates can always be had about their interpretation. 27  One consequence of moving 
to a more principles-based approach may mean, therefore, that the compliance role will need 
additional senior management support, particularly when seeking to engage the business in a 
discussion of whether a proposed behaviour or strategy will be principle-compliant.  Similarly, 
detailed rules are more useful for regulators dealing with ill intentioned and ill informed firms 
than more general rules.28  Finally, detailed rules can be useful for regulators themselves, 
facilitating quick processing of a high number of cases, and ensuring consistency of interpretation 
and application by a high number of officials, particularly where they are geographically 
dispersed.29 
 
Further, whether or not principles enhance compliance depends on the broader regulatory context, 
in particular the incentive structures the firm has for compliance or non-compliance, and its 
attitude towards the regulatory regime.30   In short, whether either the positive or negative effects 
of principles are realised depends on more than just the principle, as will be addressed further 
below.    
 
 
Principles-based regulation, management-based regulation and outcome-based regulation – 
fit or misfit? 
 
It was proposed at the outset of this paper that Principles-based regulation is being used by the 
FSA to refer not only to basing regulation on a particular type of rule, but to “outcome-based” 
regulation and “management-based” regulation as well. Both strategies have potential advantages 
                                                     
25 M.W. Nelson, “Behavioural Evidence on the Effects of Principles- and Rules-Based Standards”. (2003) 
17 (1) American Accounting Association 91 
26 ibid. Principles-based regulation may thus be bad for lawyers! 
27 Ibid for examples. 
28 Baldwin, loc. cit. 
29 Diver, loc. cit. 
30 V. Braithwaite, K. Murphy and M. Reinhart, “Taxation Threat, Motivational Postures and Responsive 
Regulation” (2007) 29(1) Law and Policy 137 
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which are in line with those of using Principles. Outcome-based regulation, at least to the extent 
that it involves a focus on substantive achievement of regulatory objectives, is compatible with 
using Principles. A focus on senior management responsibilities is an inherent part of Principles-
based regulation in that a significant amount of responsibility for interpreting and applying the 
rules is necessarily devolved to the firm itself. This can have the benefit of enhancing compliance 
as firms take responsibility for compliance, and are better suited to knowing how their internal 
processes need to be structured in order to achieve compliance and to monitor them 
appropriately.31 
 
However, there is no reason analytically why the duties of firms in outcome-based regulation and 
management-based regulation have to be communicated in Principles. Both outcome-based 
regulation and management-based regulation are also compatible with using rules which are more 
detailed and precise. They are thus potentially prey to the same weaknesses, and offer the same 
strengths, as detailed rules. All three strategies have limitations and drawbacks, however, as the 
next section will discuss. 
 
The risks and challenges of a more Principles-based approach  
 
There are clearly risks and challenges associated with a move to more principles-based regulation, 
both for the regulator and the regulated community. 
 
These are considered under the following headings: 
• legal obstacles 
• lack of certainty 
• proliferation of guidance 
• regulatory creep 
• minimum standards vs. best practice 
• accountability issues 
• predictability and the risk of over-zealous/hindsight-driven enforcement 
• the skills and mindset required of regulators and regulated 
 
Legal obstacles 
 
Legal obstacles are clearly particular to the individual regulatory regime in question.  The key 
legal limitation on the FSA’s use of its rule-making power is EC law. The interaction between the 
Principles and EC law remains unclear, but the FSA appears to envisage that firms should 
acquaint and advise themselves as to how the FSA’s high level Principles fit together with EC 
law rules.32 
 
Undoubtedly the prescriptive terms of some of the rules required to be adopted pursuant to EC 
directives such as the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”) will hamper a move 
towards Principles-based regulation. Moreover, when faced with “maximum harmonisation” 
                                                     
31 C. Parker, The Open Corporation (Oxford: 2000). 
32 The FSA is proposing to insert a “perfect implementation” clause into the rules on the application of the 
Principles to MiFID business. This simply states that “A firm will not be subject to a Principle to the extent 
that it would be contrary to the UK’s obligations under Single Market Directive”. As a result the onus 
would be placed on firms to establish whether a Directive is a “maximum harmonisation” Directive or not 
and to what extent the Principles, as interpreted by them, are compatible with the requirements of the 
Directive. See DP 07/2 Implementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, January 2007 – 
Annex 3, PRIN 3.1.6 
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measures, the FSA’s ability to impose broad Principles in addition to EC requirements will also 
be restricted.   
 
However, as the FSA points out, as a result of the Lamfalussy process, EC Directives increasingly 
include high level requirements which are similar to Principles. For example, Article 19 of MiFID 
imposes a broad obligation on MiFID firms to act in the best interests of their customers.33  It 
could be argued that the move to more broadly based standards is to be welcomed; and indeed 
that MiFID is in many places too detailed.   Here the age-old dilemma of EU harmonisation 
returns – how to ensure equivalent interpretations and implementation in each member state 
whilst allowing each the flexibility to develop rules for its own contexts.  For example, it seems 
likely that the FSA might take the view that the breadth of the obligation in Article 19 of MiFID 
is such that all MiFID firms may still be required to meet the demands of the TCF initiative – 
demands that will not be made in many other EU member states.  The risk of principles-based 
regulation in the EU context is thus simply the risk of implementation at the national level moved 
up to the supranational level: viz. the risk that divergent interpretations of EC principles will be 
adopted by regulators in different member states (at the national level, by different firms and 
supervisors), thereby frustrating the harmonisation which those principles were intended to 
achieve.  
 
Lack of certainty 
 
The standard criticism of principles-based regulation is lack of certainty.  Principles do not give 
the industry the comfort of knowing where it stands because the meaning of the Principles is not 
sufficiently certain.  The FSA has recognised that it must be possible to predict, at the time of the 
action concerned, whether or not it would be a breach of a Principle.34  There is a distinction, 
however, between predictability and certainty.  Certainty with respect to rules means that there is 
a shared understanding between those applying the rule as to its meaning and application in 
particular instances.  Predictability refers more to the regulatory response – that regulators will 
always respond to similar situations in similar ways, and so the regulated firms know what the 
supervisory and enforcement response will be.  A degree of uncertainty can be accepted if firms 
know that the regulator will allow them a certain ‘margin of appreciation’ in their interpretations, 
and will respect due efforts to construct a reasonable interpretation and act accordingly.  
Moreover, uncertainty will increase if the regulator has developed internal understandings on the 
application of rules which are not reflected in its published statements.35  However, what 
underlies the concerns about lack of certainty is often lack of predictability: we (firms, 
professional advisors) may get it wrong, but will we be prosecuted / fined / sued as a result?  
Regulation is prospective, it aims to guide future conduct.  Firms require as part of certainty 
confirmation from the regulator that both their current behaviour and their proposed courses of 
action, are on one side of the line or the other, and that if the supervisor accepts that conduct now, 
that no enforcement action will ensue further down the track.  The question is how to provide 
both certainty and predictability whilst giving firms the flexibility and space to innovate that 
principles can create. 
 
 
Proliferation of guidance 
 
                                                     
33 This is has the structure of a principle, but will be implemented as a rule in FSA’s handbook.   
34 FSA, Consultation Paper 07/2, Reviewing the Enforcement and Decision Making Manuals, January 2007.   
35 For discussion see J. Black, ‘Talking about Regulation’ [1998] Public Law 77-98. 
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One of the principal means by which it is often suggested that sufficient certainty can be 
delivered is through the provision of guidance in various forms. Guidance can be provided in a 
number of different ways, formal and informal:  
 
 more detailed rules 
 formal guidance from the regulator 
 infomal guidance from the regulator including speeches, Dear CEO letters, FAQs etc 
 worked examples 
 industry guidance (with or without confirmation from the regulator) 
 public enforcement actions – both contested and settled 
 decisions of the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) 
 ongoing dialogue between regulator and regulated, including individual guidance, risk 
mitigation plans, risk assessments  
 
In both financial services and tax regulation, there is a growing consensus that the most 
appropriate response is to combine Principles with elaboration in the form of guidance rather than 
more detailed rules. Indeed this is the basis on which the TCF initiative proceeds. TCF is not 
contained in the handbook, rather its requirements are elaborated in a series of “statements”, 
“cluster reports”, self assessment questionnaires, factsheets and worked examples. 
 
However, the elaboration of Principles in different forms of guidance can itself lead to problems: 
 
 Increasing prescription, complexity and inaccessibility can occur if Principles are 
elaborated in a multitude of mandatory or quasi-mandatory  provisions stemming from a 
range of different sources. Unless great care is taken in the formulation of guidance it 
could simply reintroduce detail and prescription in a much less transparent and accessible 
way. The practical reality is that most firms currently treat most FSA guidance as though 
it were binding.36  If poorly used, guidance therefore threatens the objective of giving 
greater freedom for firms to develop their own approaches that Principles-based 
regulation promises. For that objective to be achieved, there needs to be space within 
which firms have the freedom to manoeuvre and the confidence to exercise that freedom. 
 The risk of inconsistency, as each new piece of guidance expresses another “good idea” 
but the overall sum of guidance is never assessed, simply because it is expressed in so 
many disparate sources. 
 A body of “case law” which could become increasingly complex and inaccessible and 
prescriptive could be generated, over time, if reliance is placed on decided cases as 
precedents for the interpretation of the Principles.37    
                                                     
36 In fact the FSA makes clear that Guidance is not binding: “Whatever guidance is used for, it is not 
binding on those to whom the Act and rules apply, nor does it have ‘evidential’ effect. It need not be 
followed in order to achieve compliance with the relevant rule or other requirement. So a firm cannot incur 
disciplinary liability merely because it has not followed guidance. Nor is there any presumption that 
departing from guidance is indicative of a breach of the relevant rule” (Reader’s Guide). But note the FSA 
is currently consulting on a change to its enforcement policy which would make clear that guidance 
(including informal guidance in speeches and Dear CEO letters) may be relevant and taken into account in 
enforcement actions. 
37 Analogies are sometimes made between the use of principles in regulation and common law principles.  
The analogy is misplaced for a number of reasons, not least because of the institutional infrastructure which 
supports the elaboration of common law  according to strict rules of precedent, resulting in a complex 
“sedimentation” of case law which requires considerable legal training to decipher: T. Murphy, The Oldest 
Social Science (OUP, 1997).  
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 Reliance on settled cases as authoritative interpretations of the Principles presents 
additional concerns.  The FSA asserts that settlements have ‘precedent value’.38 It is 
impossible, however, to escape the fact that they represent a compromise on both sides, 
accentuated by plea-bargaining.  The dynamics of a settlement negotiation are not 
conducive to a pure and objective interpretation and application of the Principles. Whilst 
this may not be a criticism on the facts of the particular case, it does present real 
difficulties in knowing how far that interpretation is applicable in other factual situations, 
whether directly or by analogy.  
 The regulator risks depriving itself of the benefits of a principles-based approach by an 
over-proliferation of guidance, creating expectations as to its own conduct in the future, 
and a sense of obligation which it does not intend guidance to have, but which firms 
nonetheless treat it has having. 
 
In short, ultimate certainty is an impossible goal. It is possible to have too much guidance in a 
Principles-based regime such that it becomes rule-based regulation by the back door – in a way 
that avoids the usual checks and balances which apply to the promulgation of formal rules.  Thus 
although both the regulator and the industry may gain initial benefits from a Principles-based 
regime, as the body of informal and formal guidance grows and ossifies, those benefits will be 
lost unless the regulator can give firms the room in which to develop the flexibility in compliance 
which will allow them truly to innovate 
 
An increasing gap between internal regulatory guidance and published principles and rules 
 
There is a danger that in an attempt to ensure internal consistency of interpretation and 
application of principles that internal guidance will proliferate which is increasingly at odds with 
the published principles, rules or guidance.  This increases uncertainty and unpredictability, and 
raises key issues of accountability.39 
 
 
 “Regulatory creep” and a blurring of the distinction between minimum standards and best 
practice 
 
Linked to the proliferation of guidance is a risk that Principles-based regulation can give rise to 
charges of “regulatory creep”.40 As we have seen, in the context of TCF, high level Principles 
have been used to extend the FSA’s scrutiny into areas such as “product design” which had not 
previously been thought to be the subject of regulatory requirements. The FSA might seek to 
extend its regulatory remit into other areas in this way. This could result in the FSA pushing the 
boundaries of its statutory jurisdiction as well as raising questions as to whether it is an 
appropriate way to develop regulatory policy. 
 
The reluctance to identify a bright line between what is acceptable or unacceptable may also 
result in a blurring of the distinction between minimum standards and best practice. Firms are to 
be left to work out standards for themselves and there must be a risk that they will set them either 
uncomfortably high or too low.  As firms develop their own “rules” in the form of internal 
policies and procedures, there is a risk that these become a stick with which to beat them. The 
FSA may hold a firm to a standard which it voluntarily adopted but which was not necessary for 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
38  
39 For discussion see J. Black, ‘Talking about Regulation’ [1998] Public Law 77-98. 
40 Better Regulation Task Force, Regulatory Creep (London: 2004). 
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it to achieve compliance.41  A more Principles-based regime might, therefore, actually operate as 
a disincentive to strive for higher standards. 
 
Conversely, it might be that the blurring of the line between minimum standards and best practice 
leads to a tendency for firms to adopt overly cautious approaches. This is particularly likely to be 
the case where they regard the standard as unclear, the stance that the regulator will take as 
unpredictable, or the expected cost of non-compliance as high (because of the probability of high 
sanctions and/or a high risk of detection and the fact that a public finding of breach of Principles 
is regarded as particularly damaging to reputation). This could inhibit rather than encourage 
innovation. 
 
 
Accountability 
 
This leads us into the question of accountability.  Accountability is crucial to public, industry and 
consumer confidence in the regulatory regime. The move to more Principles-based regulation 
could result in concerns over accountability in a number of ways.  
 
As noted above, the TCF initiative has demonstrated that it is possible for the FSA to effect quite 
significant shifts in regulatory policy by promulgating a new interpretation of a Principle through 
discussion papers and the like. The requirement on firms to undertake a “TCF programme” has 
been imposed without any specific rule being made. TCF has been developed quite independently 
from the handbook. TCF is based on the Principles for Businesses, but it reaches much further 
into the deeper recesses of firms’ activities, and indeed those of the retail product supply and 
distribution chain, than the handbook ever did. However, its elaboration has not been subject to 
the consultation processes that the FSA is obliged to go through when making rules. Although the 
FSA has begun to consult more formally on TCF initiatives there is concern that Principles-based 
regulation could effectively be used to bypass the key statutory requirements to which the FSA is 
subject when it issues formal rules and guidance37, namely that it must consult publicly (and in 
particular with representatives of the industry and consumers) and must subject rules and general 
guidance to cost-benefit analysis. 
 
The FSA’s proposals to “confirm” industry guidance give rise to similar issues. In its November 
2006 discussion paper,38 the FSA proposed provisions that the guidance provider demonstrate 
that the impacts on consumers and other market participants had been considered, and the FSA 
reserved the right to require them to consult with particular groups. There is to be no separate 
consultation requirement, however, nor will the guidance be subject to cost-benefit analysis. As 
the guidance is meant to be linked directly to particular handbook provisions, the FSA argues in 
effect that it can rely on the consultation and cost-benefit processes that attended the formation of 
those provisions – in other words, on a chain of accountability from the FSA through to the 
guidance. However, there is a need to afford adequate consultation on a more consistent basis to 
ensure the process does not become dominated by narrow self-interest. There are also risks for the 
trade associations themselves that they may fall into a role that involves them being gradually co-
opted into the regulator’s role in standard setting – a role that sits uncomfortably with their role as 
advocates for the industry. 
 
                                                     
41 In the Deutsche Bank case the FSA imposed a penalty for breach of its Stabilisation Rules even though 
they did not apply on the basis that the bank had adopted an internal policy that it would comply with the 
FSA rules. 
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Predictability and the risk of overzealous/hindsight-driven enforcement 
 
It was noted above that certainty and predictability are related but separate concerns.  The 
regulator’s response to regulatory non-compliance should be predictable, rational and consistent.  
Principles can facilitate a co-operative and educative approach to compliance, which can help 
firms that are well-intentioned and disposed to comply. However, compliance-based, educative 
approaches based on Principles and guidance are open to abuse by other, less well-intentioned 
firms, for whom enforcement action based on more detailed rules is more appropriate.42 Although 
heavy sanctioning can act as a deterrent to non-compliance in many  cases,43 the anticipated error 
costs for firms of “getting it wrong” are higher with respect to Principles than detailed rules 
(assuming that the approach to enforcement is otherwise the same), and firms will structure their 
behaviour accordingly. There is a potential danger that this will lead to “over-compliance”, with 
firms adopting overly conservative courses of action thinking that to do otherwise will be 
considered by the FSA to constitute non-compliance. Over-zealous enforcement action is also 
likely to lead to a deterioration of the relationship between regulator and regulated firm,44 
particularly if the firm thinks the regulator is acting with the benefit of hindsight. 
 
Further, it is unclear at present to what extent the FSA intends that a failure to achieve the 
“outcomes” to which it refers should have direct regulatory consequences (eg, enforcement action) 
or should only be a consideration in the exercise of the FSA’s discretion as to where to focus its 
supervisory or enforcement resources. There are a number of problems with moving to a fully 
outcomes-based model in which the primary, enforceable obligation imposed on firms is to 
achieve a specified “outcome”: 
 
 • The Principles are not currently framed as outcome-based standards and would require 
significant amendment. 
 Enforcing a rule that specifies an outcome (but not the manner in which that outcome 
should be achieved) is dependant on reaching a fair and objective measure as to whether 
or not a firm has achieved a particular outcome. This is very difficult to achieve: 
quantitative measures are only ever proxies for quality of behaviour, can skew activities 
away from the achievement of the substantive  objectives, and are themselves open to 
creative compliance.45 As a result, organisations can “hit the target but miss the point’.46 
                                                     
42 Baldwin, loc. cit. 
43 G. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach” (1968) 76 J Pol Econ 161; G. Stigler, 
“The Optimum Enforcement of Laws” (1970) 78 J Pol 
Econ 526; but see T. Makkai and J. Braithwaite, “The Limits of the Economic Analysis of Regulation: An 
Empirical Case and a Case for Empiricism” (1993) 
15 (4) Law and Policy 271. 
44 I. Ayres and J. Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation (Oxford: 1992) 
 
45 One example from the public sector is the original target for local authorities’ rubbish collection. The 
target required them to ensure that a certain proportion of the rubbish they collected was recyclable. The 
authorities complied, separating out recyclable from non-recyclable rubbish. They burnt the recyclable 
rubbish. When the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions argued they had not complied 
they retorted that they had: the target required the rubbish to be recyclable, not recycled. The target was 
subsequently changed to focus on the outcome (recycling). National Audit Office, Measuring the 
Performance of Government Departments, HC301 Session 2000-2001 (London, 2001), p.30 
46 G. Bevan and C. Hood,. “What’s Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the English public 
healthcare system” (2006) 84(3) Public Administration 517. 
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 It would also require that the FSA have power to take enforcement action on the basis of 
failure to achieve outcomes even where there is no element of fault. This is because as 
soon as the element of fault is introduced, responsibility for determining what steps it is 
reasonable for firms to take to achieve the outcome moves from the regulated firm to the 
FSA and, ultimately, the Tribunal. Although many regulatory regimes in the UK are strict 
liability regimes, there is substantial evidence that prosecutions are only taken where the 
regulator considers there is a degree of moral blame attached to the breach.   There are 
significant risks that a “no fault” enforcement regime combined with ill-defined 
outcomes and unreliable measures would be likely to result in stifling over-regulation and 
over-compliance. 
 
It is also unclear what the FSA considers to be the enforcement consequences of its more 
management-based strategies. Does the FSA consider that compliance with its “deadline” for the 
implementation of firms’ TCF programmes is required by Principle 6 or is it simply an 
exhortation which may, if it is not heeded, result in intensified supervisory attention? Enshrining 
management-based standards (for example, the requirement to have a TCF programme) in rules is 
one option. However, management-based regulation can degenerate into process-based regulation 
when both managers and supervisors place an emphasis on demonstrating compliance with 
processes, which are again easier to monitor, over demonstrating achievement of outcomes, 
which are far harder to assess47 (“going through the motions” of a TCF programme for the sake of 
satisfying the FSA, for example). This may put management-based regulation in tension with 
outcome-based regulation and with the use of Principles.  
 
Finally, it is unclear what the relationship is between Principles-based regulation and the FSA’s 
risk framework of supervision, Arrow II. There is little discussion in the FSA’s various 
publications as to how these will interact. Will Arrow II be in practice the supervisory face of 
Principles-based regulation? If so, then to what extent is the refashioning of the handbook linked 
into the risk factors identified in the Arrow II regime? If not, how are Arrow II and Principles-
based regulation going to interact in practice? 
 
 
The skills and mindset of regulators and regulated 
 
A more Principles-based regime will require a revolution in the relationship between firms and 
the FSA. It may well be that this would be a change significantly for the better, but it will only 
work if there is a corresponding change in skills and attitudes. The challenges here are twofold. 
 
A substantial change in the skills, judgement and mindset of supervisors is required. The FSA 
needs to carve out a space in which firms can innovate.  If the industry is given latitude to pursue 
outcomes but swift recourse is made to enforcement if mistakes are made, even if those outcomes 
themselves are not damaged, the industry will become less engaged with such an approach.  This 
is particularly true if all reasonable efforts have been made by firms to comply.  The FSA will 
have to demonstrate sensitivity in deploying its enforcement resources in a Principles-based 
regime, particularly because the reputational damage in the wake of a breach of Principle is 
                                                     
47 J. Braithwaite (2003), “Meta risk management and responsive regulation for tax system integrity” Law 
and Policy 25(1): 1-16; C. Coglianese and D. Lazer (2003), “Management Based Regulation: Prescribing 
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals” Law & Society Review 37: 691-730; P. May, 
“Performance-based regulation and regulatory regimes: the saga of leaky buildings” (2003) 25 (4) Law & 
Policy 381-401. 
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perceived to be greater. This demands in turn a more sophisticated dialogue between firms and 
their supervisory officers.  At present, the industry perceive a significant gap between the attitude 
and ability of those working in the strategy and policy division of the FSA to those working in 
supervision and enforcement.  The former are far more willing to engage with firms than th e 
latter.  However, firms are going to have to be able to debate with supervisors the issues which 
they have with the application of the Principles in a way which is constructive and timely. 
Supervisors will have to accept that consistency of practice between different firms is not 
necessarily a goal in itself. Rather, what needs to be assessed is whether a particular firm’s 
method of doing business is appropriate to enable that firm to meet the Principles, which in turn 
demands a good level of understanding of the reasons why the firm has decided to do business in 
that particular way.  All supervisors, including those working in the call centres, will have to be 
able to engage in such a dialogue in ways which will be supported by more senior management.  
These judgements will also have to be backed up by the enforcement division, to reduce the risk 
of retrospective actions. 
 
A significant change in the skills, judgement and mindset of firms is equally important.  The 
transition from prescription to principles is not an easy one for firms.  Principles-based regulation, 
particularly if it takes the form of the TCF initiative, requires senior management to engage with 
regulatory issues at the highest level, and not regard these as things that can be delegated to 
compliance.  In turn, compliance divisions will have to develop a more strategic role, and find 
ways of inculcating compliance in the absence of detailed regulatory rules.  The burden on 
compliance teams and senior management will thus be significant and likely to increase under a 
more Principles-based regime.    
 
 
The “critical success factors” for a more Principles-based approach 
 
The issue thus arises as to the conditions in which Principles-based regulation will “work” to 
deliver the potential benefits outlined above, to ensure synergy between the three strands of the 
FSA’s own articulation of “Principles-based regulation” and also to maintain an appropriate 
degree of consumer protection and of accountability of the regulatory regime as a whole. 
 
It is suggested that there are seven key preconditions for making Principles-based regulation work 
for regulators, firms and investors: 
 
1  Developing criteria to identify what is the appropriate balance between Principles and 
other types of rules 
 
In a regime of the scope and complexity of the FSA regulatory regime it is not possible simply to 
have Principles and guidance. Some “fixed points” are needed: rules which set out in more 
detailed form what conduct is required, and thus provide safe harbours in effect from subsequent 
charges of non-compliance in a more concrete way than compliance with guidance can.  What is 
this balance, and how can we identify where more detailed rules, guidance or “fixed points” are 
needed? The FSA has made general statements that detailed rules will be used where necessary, 
and as noted, may be needed to implement EC requirements. However, there has been very little 
sustained attention paid to this question to date by either the FSA or industry.  Some key 
questions, when devising criteria as to when more detailed rules (as opposed to guidance) may be 
needed, include: 
 
 Where is uniformity/standardisation or at least comparability of means (not just ends) 
required, by whom and for what reason?  For example, there are good reasons for 
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providing detailed rules on how information on products and charges should be 
communicated to retail investors to facilitate comparability between products.  Or there 
are good reasons for providing common definitions of capital.   Identifying where 
uniformity or standardisation of means or processes analysis of a much greater degree of 
granularity than has been done to date. 
 Where is it more cost-effective to have a bright line rule, a detailed rule or a Principle, 
and for whom?   There is an economic dimension to the issue of the appropriate balance 
between rules and principles.  There are three main types of cost involved in rule-making 
and application to be borne in mind, both micro-level and macro-level.  These costs can 
be differently distributed between the regulator, the regulated and the beneficiary of the 
regulation depending on the type of rule adopted: 
– the costs of rule making: initial information costs and subsequent costs of 
elaboration through guidance, enforcement decisions, waivers and so on.  Principles 
have low initial formation costs but potentially higher elaboration costs for both 
regulator and regulated than detailed rules; they also potentially remove leverage 
from compliance divisions within firms trying to persuade senior management to 
develop particular processes or refrain from certain conduct on the basis of a general 
principle; 
– the costs of rule application: interpretation costs (in accumulating all aspects of the 
rule, including additional guidance, elaboration in enforcement actions and obtaining 
legal advice); application costs (in gathering and interpreting all relevant information 
to ascertain whether the rule applies); and dynamic costs (keeping up with changes in 
rules).  These fall on both regulator and regulated, and can arise in both detailed rules 
and principles; 
– the social and economic costs of over-inclusion or under-inclusion in particular 
instances:  the potential ‘chilling effect’ of principles when combined with an 
aggressive and /  or unpredictable enforcement regime was noted above.  However, 
there is almost no work done in financial regulation as to where it would be more 
costly or beneficial to err on the side of making a potentially over-inclusive rule or a 
potentially under-inclusive rule, given this potential chilling effect. 
 
 Where are the incentives of firms not to comply such that more detailed rules may be 
needed?  As noted above, one size does not fit all – detailed rules may be necessary in 
order to deal with certain types of firms, or at least likely responses in certain situations.  
Moreover, detailed rules can provide leverage from compliance divisions within firms 
trying to persuade senior management to develop particular processes or refrain from 
certain conduct on the basis of a general principle.  It may be that guidance is sufficient in 
most cases, but rules may be necessary for particularly significant issues, notably 
significant market failures or where particular types of conduct poses high risks to 
regulatory objectives.  In the FSA context, this would mean a closer tie-in between 
principles-based regulation and the risk-based regulation of Arrow II. 
 
 
 Should a private right of action be available?  This is a question which is specific to the 
FSA context, as the FSA can attach the private right of action to rules, but not Principles, 
even though some of the rules that it attaches to are themselves very broadly based (such 
a suitability).   It is unclear what the FSA considers the implications of the move to more 
principles based regulation on the private right of action to be; or whether it considers 
that redress via the Financial Ombudsman Service is sufficient.  The desire to provide a 
private right of action could however be a criterion for retaining or developing a rule 
rather than a principle in particular instances.  
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 What is the degree of trust between regulators and regulated firms as to whether the rule 
will be interpreted and applied appropriately in particular circumstances, and therefore 
whether Principles or more detailed rules are required?  This is fundamental to the 
decision, but is the hardest to evaluate. This relationship is only in part constituted by the 
rules themselves, so firms and the FSA will be unable to prejudge this issue – rather, both 
sides will need to work together to establish trust in the newly created regulatory context. 
 
2  Discipline and restraint in the provision of general FSA or industry guidance 
 
Great care will be needed to strike the right balance between the provision of guidance on the 
meaning of the Principles and the need to avoid the dangers inherent in the proliferation of 
guidance (whether from the FSA or from industry bodies). There is substantial evidence that 
guidance can facilitate compliance if it the wording is kept short and concise. Worked examples 
can also be particularly beneficial. This is an approach that the FSA favours (both for its own and 
industry guidance) – the provision of case studies and examples to illustrate “good” and 
“bad” practice. In situations of uncertainty, people make decisions by analogy. More particularly, 
people work out how to comply with imprecise rules by reasoning by analogy, and well chosen 
examples can facilitate this process.48  As the FSA has recognised, steps will need to be taken to 
ensure that the body of material available to regulated firms does not become overly complex, 
prescriptive and inaccessible. Both regulator and regulated firm may well need to exercise self-
restraint: on the firms’ part in asking for ever greater predictability, and on the regulators’ part for 
trying to provide it.   
 
3  Meeting the needs of different firms 
 
A frequent response to Principles-based regulation is that it is inappropriate for small firms who 
lack the resources and expertise to develop interpretations of imprecise rules, and would prefer to 
be simply told what to do. At the same time, most struggle to cope with the handbook in its 
present form. To an extent, different firms can need different rules, with small firms relying more 
on regulator-produced guidance, examples and so on.49  This is recognised in the approach 
employed in relation to capital requirements under the new Basle II/Capital Requirements 
Directive regime. This provides firms with the option of either complying with certain “bright 
line” rules in order to calculate their regulatory capital or developing and using their own risk 
models.  Extension of this concept to other areas of the regulatory regime may help to address the 
problem that  ‘one size does not fit all’. 
 
4  Ensuring an appropriate style of supervision and enforcement and a balance between 
the two 
 
As noted above, supervision and enforcement is critical to the success of a principles-based 
regime.   The dialogue between firms and the regulator in the supervisory relationship is critical; 
but that dialogue in turn is shaped by the enforcement context – by the presence of the ‘shotgun 
behind the door’.  There are five inter-related issues, some of which are particular to the FSA 
context, others of which are of more general relevance. 
                                                     
48 To an extent this is the common law method; however in non-legal life the process is far less bounded by 
the strict interpretive norms which characterize and structure judicial reasoning. 
49 Baldwin, loc. cit. 
  23 
• The FSA’s enforcement responses need to be carefully calibrated so as not inhibit firms’ 
willingness to develop their own solutions to compliance with the Principles. There may, for 
example, need to be adjustments to the level(s) of penalty, the way in which cases are chosen for 
enforcement, and the frequency of internal review of investigations to determine whether they 
should continue. 
• Principles-based regulation may require a change in the FSA’s approach to supervision. 
Predictability has to be developed through dialogue between regulated firms and the FSA. One of 
the key places where that dialogue occurs is in the supervisory process. The FSA needs to be 
prepared to offer predictability in that process by committing to judgements on the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of firms’ interpretations of the Principles in particular 
circumstances.  This has particular implications for those firms who are ranked as low priorities 
in the FSA’s risk-based supervisory regime.  These firms do not have individual supervisors 
assigned to them but rather all queries are referred to a call centre.  Developing the appropriate 
dialogues and relationships of trust in this context will be particularly challenging. 
• Enforcement of Principles-based regulation may require a “due diligence” defence or be based 
on a “range of reasonable interpretations”.   The FSA is currently proposing a change to its 
enforcement policy to apply a new test for determining whether to take enforcement action, 
namely whether, “had a reasonable firm in that position applied their mind to the question they 
would have realised the risks they faced”.50  It is questionable whether this is a sufficiently strong 
statement to give firms confidence to adopt diverse approaches to complying with the Principles. 
In contrast, due diligence defences can create incentives for managers to invest in improving their 
internal systems and controls, as they will be given recognition in enforcement actions.51 There is 
also a strong argument for formalising their use in Principles-based regulation if the firm can 
show that it took all reasonable steps to interpret and apply the Principles in good faith. The 
question as to whether the firm should also need to show that it acted in accordance with 
published guidance is problematic if part of the objective of a more Principles-based approach is 
to encourage firms to develop their own approaches. It could be argued that, rather than 
strengthening the role of guidance in the enforcement process52 the  FSA needs to do more to 
emphasise its non-binding nature. 
 
5  Redefining the role of decided enforcement cases 
 
The FSA regime is unusual in the degree to which the courts are absent from the enforcement 
process.  The question of how courts should interpret general principles and their relationship 
with detailed rules is a key preoccupation in tax law, and raises quite distinct issues.53  However, 
enforcement processes which remain almost solely internal to the regulator, with only a few cases 
going to its associated specialist tribunal, also raise quite particular issues relating to 
interpretation, notably those relating to the status of previous enforcement decisions made by the 
regulator.   Enforcement decisions will assume a particular prominence in a principles-based 
regime.  To date, the Regulatory Decisions Committee which makes these decisions has not 
necessarily between very precise in its language and in phrasing its interpretations the obligations 
                                                     
50 CP 07/2 Review of the Enforcement and Decision Making Manuals, January 2007. 
51 Parker, loc. cit. 
52 In CP 07/2 it is proposed to make clear that guidance (whether in the handbook or in the form of case 
studies or Dear CEO letters) is material that the decision maker may take into account in determining 
whether enforcement action should be taken. The FSA’s earlier Discussion Paper, DP06/5, FSA 
Confirmation of Industry Guidance, suggests that FSA confirmed guidance should be afforded “sturdy 
breakwater” status, but the subsequent release of CP 07/2 and more recent FSA pronouncements leaves the 
position far from certain. 
53 For discussion see Freedman (2007), loc. cit. 
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which it determines firms are under.  The FSA has recognised that it will need to be more careful 
in the wording of its enforcement decisions.   However, if we are to avoid a drift towards 
enforcement-led regulation – and the complexity and inaccessibility that comes with the accretion 
of “case law” – we need to reconsider the role enforcement plays in providing guidance to others.  
The question arises as to whether settlements and/or enforcement actions should have formal 
precedent value, and if so, what rules of precedent should be developed.  Alternatively, should 
settlements and/or enforcement actions have the status of guidance, or “real live” worked 
examples?  All public bodies are under an obligation to act reasonably, which includes a 
requirement to act consistently between regulatees; whether it is necessary to invest enforcement 
cases with any greater degree of precedence value is doubtful.  Moreover, given the particular 
circumstances in which they arise, and the often limited information published as to the full 
circumstances surrounding them, settlements should not be seen as having any greater status than 
guidance.   
 
 
6  Ensuring that the accountability mechanisms in the regulatory rule making process 
are not bypassed 
 
The FSA has signalled a clear intention to rely increasingly on industry to produce guidance to 
elaborate on the Principles.  Notwithstanding the practical benefits of using industry guidance, 
there is a danger that it becomes an effective outsourcing of the FSA’s standard setting role, 
raising significant accountability issues. There is a strong argument that the FSA should adopt a 
clear policy that it will not seek to effect a significant change in industry behaviour on the basis of 
the Principles alone without undertaking (or ensuring that the industry body concerned 
undertakes) a consultation process and a cost-benefit analysis that meets the requirements of its 
governing legislation, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.  
 
Elaboration of the Principles in settlement and enforcement actions also raises accountability 
concerns, particularly if either or both of these are to be considered binding. If the main forum in 
which Principles receive elaboration is enforcement proceedings, it is arguable that there should 
there be wider rights of access to those proceedings by interested parties, including the Consumer 
Panel, to put forward “Brandeis brief” type papers on their own understandings of the Principles 
and the implications of alternative interpretations. 
 
7  Developing and maintaining a constructive dialogue between regulator and regulated 
firm as to the expectations and responsibilities of each in interpreting and applying the 
Principles: giving straight answers to straight questions 
 
The most critical point is left until last. There is a limit to what rules or guidance can do. What is 
key is the development of shared understandings between the FSA and regulated firms as to the 
role and purpose of Principles in the regulatory regime, understandings which can only be 
partially developed through more guidance.  Principles-based regulation will work only if there is 
on-going dialogue between the FSA and regulated firms which develops shared understandings of 
what conduct is required by the Principles. It is only through extensive regulatory conversations 
as to the objectives of the regulatory regime, to the respective roles and responsibilities of 
regulators and regulated firms in achieving those objectives, and to the interpretation and 
application of the regulatory requirements that any regulatory regime can operate, particularly 
one which is Principles-based, in all the FSA’s meanings of the term.  
 
There are a number of obstacles in the way of developing such a dialogue, however.  In particular, 
there are mismatches and ‘mindset gaps’ between firms and regulators, within firms between 
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compliance and business divisions; within regulators between policy, supervision and 
enforcement divisions, and across firms – between the well- and ill- intentioned; and the well- 
and ill-resourced.   These gaps create uncertainty and mistrust, and the difficulties they raise are 
not necessarily susceptible to the same remedy: principles.  Attitudes to the regulatory regime are 
critically shaped by the perceived fairness of the regime as a whole, which is in turn shaped not 
just by the form of the rules, or even what they say, but the manner in which they are 
administered.54  
 
Being able to engage in such strategic and constructive dialogue places significant demands both 
on regulatory culture and the capacities of all those involved in financial services regulation in 
both regulated firms and the FSA. Regulatory conversations have to be based on some “rules of 
engagement”, but it is far from clear that either industry or the FSA have begun to work out what 
these could be.   Fundamental to those rules of engagement should be an understanding and 
acceptance of two key responsibilities by firms and the FSA.  Firms have to accept responsibility 
for thinking through the application of the Principles or rules in their own particular context. The 
FSA has to support firms in exercising this responsibility by validating firm’s conduct and giving 
firm commitments to the acceptability or otherwise of the responses firms develop to the 
Principles as part of the supervisory process.  If Principles-based regulation is to work, different 
rules of engagement need to be developed. 
 
 
                                                     
54 V. Braithwaite (2007), loc. cit. 
